Anil Madhavapeddy, a professor of computer science at Cambridge and core maintainer of the OCaml compiler, has described a new reality where security issues in OCaml projects face attempted exploits within minutes of patches being shared for discussion. In a blog post, Madhavapeddy noted that a website he manages received probes for percent-encoded traversal sequences roughly ten minutes after a discussion began — suggesting automated watchers are monitoring public repositories. He demonstrated that modern coding agents can find flaws with minimal hints, switching from Claude Fable to DeepSeek V4 Pro when the former refused the task.
Nick Craig-Wood, maintainer of the file-syncing tool rclone, confirmed the trend in comments on Hacker News. He stated that in the first ten years of the rclone project, it received about 20 security disclosures through GitHub. "We had to deal with over 40 in the last month!" he wrote, adding that the hit rate for disclosures is about 75%. Craig-Wood noted that GitHub previously assigned CVEs within two to three days, but now takes three to four weeks, forcing him to ship point releases with "CVE-PENDING" in changelogs — an arrangement he described as "not ideal."
The rapid exploitation window appears incompatible with existing open source embargo practices, which assume patches can be discussed privately for several days before a public release. Madhavapeddy argued that the community needs new processes to keep projects safe.