A new research paper from cryptographers at the University of California San Diego and Inria Nancy claims to have developed an attack that dramatically reduces the computing power required to factor the large primes underpinning RSA encryption. The attack, published as a preprint, targets what is known as textbook RSA — a bare-bones version of the algorithm that lacks the padding used in most practical implementations.
The paper reports that for 1024-bit keys, the number of operations required drops from 2^80 to 2^65; for 2048-bit keys from 2^112 to 2^90; for 3072-bit from 2^128 to 2^105; and for 4096-bit from 2^144 to 2^119. While 2^65 operations remains substantial, it falls into the range that a large state actor could feasibly attempt, the authors note. They also caution that their algorithm is unoptimised and that further improvements — possibly with AI assistance or GPU acceleration — could lower the threshold further.
The attack only works against textbook RSA implementations where the plaintext is known or guessable, and does not directly break padded RSA (such as RSA-OAEP) used in most modern systems. Nonetheless, many legacy systems and some current protocols still rely on RSA in configurations that may be vulnerable.
RSA has been gradually phased out in favour of elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) and post-quantum algorithms, but it remains in widespread use for digital signatures, key exchange, and older encryption standards. The paper has been submitted for peer review, and the security community is awaiting validation of the results.