Post-training choices reshape refusal circuits but leave safety trade-offs

Across three model families, reasoning-augmented training produced distinct internal refusal computations, while no tested method combined robustness, capability preservation, and easy correction.

Academic
Hoang Cuong Nguyen · Mark Dras · Usman Naseem

Macquarie University

Research Digest··2 min read

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Post-training methods reshape how language models compute refusal, and none achieves all three desired safety properties simultaneously.

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This work compares three post-training methods for safety alignment—supervised fine-tuning (SFT), reasoning-augmented SFT (Ra-SFT), and (ORPO)—across three architecturally distinct language models (Llama-3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen3-8B). The authors find that the training method itself, not just the data, changes how refusal is computed internally: Ra-SFT produces a distinct kind of refusal computation across all models, while architecture independently shapes internal structure and steering reliability. Most importantly, no method studied achieves all three properties desired from safe alignment: refusal that is not concentrated in fragile components, safety gains without capability loss, and safety behavior that can be corrected through small targeted edits. The paper warns against treating current post-training methods as a solved or reliable defense, especially for security-critical applications.

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