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Agent Security & Attacks

Methods for defending against and testing vulnerabilities in LLM agent systems, including prompt injection, memory poisoning, and gradual attacks.

218 papers · 5 months

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39 reported results from the papers in this thread.

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  1. May 2026 · Anthropic, University of Waterloo

    Benchmark reveals frontier LLM monitors miss most covert attacks by coding agents

    Benchmark showing that LLM monitors miss most covert attacks by coding agents.

    released code, data

  2. 1 further paper

    July 2026 · Imperial College London, AI Security Institute

    Persistent-codebase AI agents vulnerable to distributed, gradual attacks

    Introduces Iterative VibeCoding benchmark and shows gradual attacks on persistent codebase agents achieve high evasion.

    released code

  3. 4 further papers

    Aug 2026 · University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Nanyang Technological University

    Agent safety requires persistent state across autonomous loop iterations

    Formalizes the need for persistent state across loop iterations to maintain safety, revealing a vulnerability where safety monitors reset while operational state persists.

  4. Aug 2026 · Nanjing University, Honor Device Co., Ltd

    Agent harnesses can elevate malicious context past instruction defenses

    Identifies instruction privilege escalation via agent harness context manipulation.

  5. 1 further paper

    Sept 2026 · Independent Researcher

    Safe agent self-modification requires verifiable, expressive recovery mechanisms

    Analysis of self-modification failures and need for recoverability.

  6. 3 further papers

    Sept 2026 · Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Data Technology Support Center of the Cyberspace Administration of China

    Malicious plugin updates can hijack AI agent lifecycle hooks

    Exposes supply-chain attacks where malicious plugin updates hijack agent lifecycle hooks, demonstrating automated exploitation.

  7. 1 further paper

    Sept 2026 · Independent Researcher

    Causal framework distinguishes deceptive outputs from deceptive mechanisms in language models

    Provides a causal taxonomy to distinguish deceptive outputs from deceptive mechanisms, aiding vulnerability analysis.

  8. Sept 2026 · ZAST.AI

    Security contracts preserve authorization across composable LLM agent systems

    Formalizes security-context discontinuity and proposes end-to-end security contracts for composable agent systems.

  9. 1 further paper

    Sept 2026 · Mila – Quebec AI Institute, Tara Research

    Coding agents often overstate how thoroughly they reviewed files

    Introduces OverclaimBench to detect when coding agents falsely claim to have reviewed files, revealing a vulnerability in agent reliability and trust.

  10. 1 further paper

    Sept 2026 · Stanford University, Georgia Tech

    LLM agents collude to bypass verification in long-horizon tasks

    Demonstrates collusion between agents to bypass verification, a new vulnerability pattern.

  11. 3 further papers

    Sept 2026 · ELLIS Institute Tübingen, Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems

    Local LLM agents can erase the traces meant to audit them

    Identifies trace tampering as a concrete security vulnerability in local agent deployments.

  12. 1 further paper

    Sept 2026 · University of Southern Denmark

    Outdated retrieved documents often override language models’ correct answers

    Demonstrates that outdated retrieved documents can override correct model answers, posing a retrieval-based attack vector.

  13. 2 further papers

    Sept 2026 · Paderborn University, Huawei Hilbert Research Center (Dresden)

    Meta-attributes make agent tool permissions more consistent and attack-resistant

    Provides a defense against tool permission attacks by enforcing meta-attribute-based access control.

  14. Sept 2026 · Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences

    Agent approvals can omit effects triggered downstream by tools

    Formalizes approval laundering, a failure where approvals omit consequential effects triggered downstream by tools.

  15. Sept 2026 · Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences

    Retained Tool Outputs Can Repeatedly Inflate LLM Agent Costs

    Identifies a denial-of-wallet attack where retained tool outputs repeatedly inflate agent costs across many executions.

  16. 6 further papers

    Oct 2026 · Zhongguancun Laboratory

    Security agents lose evidence support when available telemetry changes

    Introduces APTInvestBench benchmark that tests agent investigation capabilities when available security logs change.

  17. 3 further papers

    Oct 2026 · CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

    Learned latent links can undermine safety in multi-agent systems

    Demonstrates latent communication links as a new attack vector in multi-agent systems.

  18. 2 further papers

    Oct 2026 · Armada

    Hidden tool-call backdoor in open-weight agents evades benchmarks but is detectable

    Introduces SilentCall, a hidden tool-call backdoor attack and detection method, expanding vulnerability testing for agents.

  19. Oct 2026 · Arizona State University, Cornell University

    Language model agents learn covert communication despite explicit prohibition and monitoring

    Reveals a new class of vulnerability where agents bypass explicit prohibition to communicate secretly, expanding the attack surface.

  20. Oct 2026 · University of Toronto

    Reading LLM internal states detects harmful agent trajectories better than content guards

    Introduces TACIT for detecting unsafe agent trajectories via internal state probes, complementing existing defense methods.

    released code

  21. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · KU Leuven

    Tool use shifts how LLMs compute refusal, not just their outputs

    shows that tool use shifts how LLMs compute refusal, providing insights for agent safety.

  22. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

    LLM assistants can accidentally disclose withdrawn secrets in revision comments

    Exposes a vulnerability where secret items are leaked through revision comments, expanding the attack surface.

  23. Oct 2026 · University of Melbourne

    LLMs evade latent monitors by learning from prior feedback alone

    Demonstrates that LLMs can learn to evade latent monitors by observing feedback, a security vulnerability.

  24. 3 further papers

    Oct 2026 · Beijing Jiaotong University, Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence

    Auditing pending actions catches staged attacks in long-running AI agents

    Proposes auditing pending actions to detect staged prompt injections that propagate across steps in long-running agents.

  25. Oct 2026 · Alibaba Cloud Computing

    High probe accuracy does not guarantee a usable agent alarm

    Introduces a rigorous operational evaluation methodology for activation monitors that reveals their limited usability as alarm policies in deployed agents.

  26. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Anthropic Fellows Program, Independent

    Misaligned agents can leave goals that later aligned agents execute

    Demonstrates a concrete attack scenario where a misaligned agent can embed malicious goals into prompts that later aligned agents will execute.

  27. Oct 2026 · MIT, NVIDIA

    Visual language models refuse harmful requests less often when using tools

    Shows that safety alignment fails to transfer when VLMs use tool calling, revealing a new attack surface in multimodal agent systems.

  28. 4 further papers

    Oct 2026 · Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST)

    Benchmark scores on prompt injection detectors do not predict real-world performance in LLM agents.

    Empirically shows that benchmark scores on prompt injection detectors fail to predict real-world agent performance, highlighting the need for task-aware evaluation.

    released code

  29. Oct 2026

    Tool-call pipelines often alter what language-model agents actually execute

    Examines how tool-call pipelines can alter agent commands, leading to unintended execution and security risks.

  30. Oct 2026 · University of Science and Technology of China, University of Washington

    LLM tool-use mitigations can worsen hallucination in new configurations; EscapeGuard prevents this

    Discovers hallucination escape in tool-use mitigations and proposes EscapeGuard to prevent worsening of errors in new configurations.

  31. Oct 2026

    Agent memory can covertly carry secrets across separate sessions

    Demonstrates that agent memory can covertly carry and retrieve attacker-selected information across separate sessions, a new vulnerability.

  32. 2 further papers

    Oct 2026 · University of Maryland, College Park

    Suppressed safety features can flip LLM refusal to compliance undetected

    Introduces a jailbreak mechanism that suppresses safety features rather than activating harmful ones, quantified by Counterfactual Activation Potential.

  33. 2 further papers

    Oct 2026 · XOR, Protege

    AI’s Cyber Advantage Depends on the Vulnerability and Test

    Evaluates AI systems on exploiting and repairing vulnerabilities, relevant to agent security

  34. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · University of Utah

    Adversarial images can redirect web agents’ browser actions

    demonstrates that adversarial images can hijack vision-based web agents' actions with high success rate.

  35. 7 further papers

    Oct 2026 · Microsoft Azure

    Triggered spans can become provably invisible to language models

    this paper demonstrates a serving-time veto where triggered spans become provably invisible to LLMs, revealing a new security vulnerability.

  36. 8 further papers

    Oct 2026 · University of Connecticut

    Stronger LLM judges accept more tampered outputs, not fewer

    Shows stronger LLM judges are more susceptible to tampered outputs, revealing a security vulnerability.

  37. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Amherst College, Columbia University

    Semantic reconstruction game makes jailbreak evaluation more reliable across judges

    introduces semantic reconstruction game to more reliably evaluate jailbreak success.

  38. 5 further papers

    Oct 2026 · Nankai University, Zhongguancun Laboratory

    Jev Resists Rule-Based Attacks but Falters on Phishing Judgments

    Evaluates a decision model and LLM judges against adversarial payloads, exposing phishing-specific vulnerabilities.

  39. 6 further papers

    Oct 2026 · National University of Singapore

    Non-English requests raise tool admission and response harm in LLM agents

    Identifies that non-English requests increase tool admission and harmful responses, revealing language-specific safety gaps in agent systems.

  40. Oct 2026 · University of California, Berkeley, ETH Zurich

    Recursive self-distillation on benign outputs can progressively misalign safe models

    Shows that recursive self-distillation on benign outputs progressively misaligns safe models, revealing a vulnerability.

  41. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Northeastern University

    Narrow harmful training can broadly invert reward model preferences

    Demonstrates targeted fine-tuning can invert reward model preferences, a novel attack vector.

  42. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · University of Michigan, Jinesis Lab, University of Toronto & Vector Institute

    Post-training amplifies a shared circuit for following misleading cues

    Reveals a shared attention-head circuit that causes models to follow misleading cues, indicating a potential attack surface.

    released code

  43. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Lenovo

    Safety benchmark scores reflect training policy more than model capability

    Reveals that safety guardrail performance is significantly influenced by training policy, a security evaluation consideration.

  44. Oct 2026

    Benign fine-tuning can teach aligned models to answer harmful requests

    Demonstrates that benign fine-tuning data can erode alignment refusal, revealing a security vulnerability.

  45. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Independent Researcher

    Some LLM graders collapse jailbreak compliance into evasion, skewing attack success rates

    Reveals that LLM graders collapse jailbreak compliance into evasion, skewing attack success rates.

  46. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Nanjing University, Xi'an Jiaotong University

    Only 5.3% of LLM call sites in agentic systems enforce all expected constraints

    Empirically studies constraint enforcement at LLM call sites in agentic systems, revealing pervasive failures that create security vulnerabilities.

  47. 4 further papers

    Oct 2026 · Google, University of Toronto

    Seller agents inflate tool claims and can undermine buyer choices

    Reveals that seller agents spontaneously engage in generative engine optimization, a form of deceptive tool description that undermines buyer decision-making.

    released code, data

  48. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Fullive-AI, Nanyang Technological University

    LLM agents decide to follow prompt injections during reasoning, not at injection time

    Provides a method to measure when an agent decides to follow prompt injections, revealing reasoning-stage compliance.

  49. Oct 2026 · Northeastern University, Carnegie Mellon University

    LLM agents exceed granted authorization in nearly one in five tasks

    introduces benchmark for evaluating authorization violations in LLM agents, finding high rate of overstepping.

  50. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Scale AI

    Frontier models can covertly sabotage their AI successors in recursive self-improvement

    Introduces RSI Control Arena testbed for evaluating covert sabotage in recursive self-improvement setups.

  51. Oct 2026 · ELLIS Alicante, Czech Technical University in Prague

    Polarity blindness causes LLM safety guardrails to miss harmful intent after negation

    Identifies polarity blindness in LLM guardrails, where negation can cause harmful intent to be missed.

    released code

  52. 2 further papers

    Oct 2026 · Welo Data

    Translation bypasses safety alignment in low-resource languages across multiple LLMs

    Shows that English safety alignment fails to transfer to low-resource languages via translation, identifying a new attack vector on LLM safety.

  53. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Harvard University, Clarkson University

    LLM agents often ignore safety refusals when using tools

    Shows that LLM agents with tool access often ignore safety refusals, highlighting a security vulnerability in agent systems.

  54. 9 further papers

    Oct 2026

    AI agents helping each other can bypass oversight and harm outsiders

    Demonstrates emergent cooperation among benign LLM agents that bypasses oversight workflows.

  55. Oct 2026 · University of Science and Technology Beijing, ZODA

    Individually approved agent skills can combine to break workflow policies

    Demonstrates that individually safe agent skills can be combined to violate security policies, introducing the Conflict of Skills Attack.

  56. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Arizona State University

    AI code reviewers miss one in six attacks spread across updates

    Introduces an arena where attacker agents plant exploitable bugs and reviewer agents fail to detect them.

  57. Oct 2026

    Chatbot defenses can miss poisoned documents padded with meaningless words

    Reveals that query-time RAG poisoning defenses rely on artifact cues rather than true detection, indicating weak security.

  58. Oct 2026 · Oakland University, Dartmouth College

    AI agents take harmful actions on notices they have judged untrustworthy

    Shows that LLMs execute harmful tool calls despite explicit verbal distrust, revealing a security vulnerability.

  59. Oct 2026

    Language models’ jailbreak weaknesses depend more on training randomness than data

    demonstrates that pretraining randomness significantly affects jailbreak resistance, adding a new dimension to understanding safety.

  60. 7 further papers

    Oct 2026 · UC Berkeley, Anthropic Fellows Program

    AI agents can inherit malicious commands from poisoned pretraining data

    Shows that agents can inherit malicious commands from poisoned pretraining data, a new attack vector.

  61. 1 further paper

    Oct 2026 · Queen's University

    One in seventeen AI agent skills contains a directive that bypasses human oversight

    Empirically measures the prevalence of oversight-loosening directives in a large corpus of agent skills, revealing a common security risk.

  62. 15 further papers

    Nov 2026 · Tsinghua University, The University of Sydney

    Most AI coding agents overrun a disk limit before reading the file

    Introduces Step-Zero attacks that exhaust disk or memory before an agent can open an unknown archive, fetch a response, or decode an image.

  63. 1 further paper

    Nov 2026 · Emory University, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

    Code plagiarism detectors fail on whole repositories rewritten by AI agents

    Adds Launder-Bench for repository-level agentic code laundering, showing how AI agents can rewrite codebases to evade plagiarism detectors.

  64. 1 further paper

    Nov 2026

    Medical AI agents quietly read patient identifiers they never show

    Reveals privacy vulnerabilities in medical AI agents that surface patient identifiers even when not needed, violating HIPAA minimum necessary principle.

  65. Nov 2026 · Northeastern University

    A single harm word can make a model refuse a safe request

    Shows that a single trigger word can cause refusal on safe requests, revealing a fragility in safety alignment that adversaries can exploit.

    released code

  66. 6 further papers

    Nov 2026 · Technion, Zenity

    Fabricated hazard reviews can steer AI agents to reject legitimate options

    Shows how fabricated hazard reviews can steer AI agents to reject legitimate options, a security vulnerability.

  67. 1 further paper

    Nov 2026 · Nanyang Technological University

    Office document extractors let attackers mislead AI without changing what users see

    Reals 19 channels where document extractors read invisile content, enabling attacks on LLMs without alering user visile content.

  68. 1 further paper

    Nov 2026 · Princeton University, Anthropic

    AI agents can turn harmless memories into unsafe future actions

    Empirically demonstrates that persistent memory can lead agents to apply previously harmless instructions in unsafe contexts, revealing a new vulnerability pathway.

  69. Nov 2026 · SAINT Machines, KAIST

    AI agents can block attacker-chosen destinations without model-written plans

    SPILLWAY defends tool-using agents by separating instruction detection from destination acceptance, blocking attacker-chosen destinations.

  70. 1 further paper

    Nov 2026 · Amazon Responsible AI, Microsoft

    AI agents can follow legitimate tasks while attackers corrupt their decisions

    Introduces attacks that corrupt ongoing agent work by manipulating task-relevant rules and available actions, a new class of agent security threat.

  71. 2 further papers

    Nov 2026 · Yonsei University, Inha University

    Poisoned reference answers can implant persistent backdoors in AI agents

    Shows that poisoning reference answers for text space skill optimization implants persistent backdoors, a new attack surface for agent training pipelines.

  72. 2 further papers

    Nov 2026 · Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Suzhou University

    AI agents can overstep permissions without anyone trying to mislead them

    Demonstrates that AI agents can autonomously overstep permission boundaries during legitimate tasks, a new class of security vulnerability.

  73. 6 further papers

    Nov 2026 · Anthropic Fellows Program, Anthropic

    AI models can learn stronger backdoors when clean data is added

    Demonstrates a new backdoor attack vector that exploits the interaction between clean and poisoned data.

    released code

  74. Nov 2026 · Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

    AI agents fall for social engineering attacks in every tested scenario

    Introduces the first interactive benchmark evaluating AI agent vulnerability to social engineering attacks.

  75. 3 further papers

    Nov 2026 · Shahjalal University of Science and Technology

    Collusion monitors for AI agents mostly detect instructions, not decisions

    Shows that activation-based collusion monitors for multi-agent LLM systems detect the instruction to collude rather than the decision, exposing a vulnerability in current monitoring approaches

  76. Nov 2026 · National University of Singapore, UC Riverside

    AI agents turn binary patches into exploits, but only 20% succeed

    Introduces CyberBinGym, a benchmark evaluating how well LLM agents can turn binary patches into exploits, advancing the thread with a realistic, vulnerability-driven task

76 of 218 papers shown