Thursday 15 October 2026
Night Edition
ZOTPAPER

News without the noise

ZOTPAPER
Geopolitics

Undersea cables face rising sabotage risks as gray-zone warfare grows, new book warns

Elisabeth Braw's 'Undersea War' examines suspicious incidents where ships dragging anchors have damaged critical seabed infrastructure across the Baltic Sea and Pacific Ocean

By LineZotpaper
Published
Read Time2 min
Most of the world's internet traffic still travels through subsea cables crisscrossing ocean floors, but these fiber-optic links, along with oil and gas pipelines and submarine power cables, now face growing sabotage risks as gray-zone warfare and open conflicts become widespread, according to a new book by Atlantic Council senior fellow Elisabeth Braw.

In "Undersea War," Braw explores the modern rise in suspicious incidents in which ships dragging their anchors for unusually long periods have cut or damaged undersea cables and pipelines from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. The book warns that the invisible infrastructure beneath the waves is entering a danger zone as state and non-state actors exploit ambiguity in international waters.

Braw acknowledges that about 60 percent of undersea cable damage is primarily due to human error during fishing and shipping activities, when weighted nets or anchors drag across the seabed. Natural hazards such as storms and undersea landslides also account for a smaller proportion of incidents. In total, between 150 and 200 cables are damaged each year and are usually repaired quickly.

Despite the expansion of Starlink and other communications satellite services, most global internet traffic still depends on the undersea backbone. The coexistence of these cables with energy infrastructure creates a concentrated target set in an environment where attribution is difficult and response options are limited.

§

Analysis

Why This Matters

  • The integrity of undersea cables is essential for global internet connectivity, financial markets, and international communications; sabotage could disrupt entire economies.
  • Gray-zone attacks are hard to attribute and may escalate without triggering a full military response, creating a persistent threat that falls below the threshold of open war.
  • Rapid repair of 150–200 cables per year suggests routine damage is manageable, but coordinated or targeted sabotage could overwhelm repair capacity.

Background

Subsea cables carry the vast majority of intercontinental data traffic, making them a critical but vulnerable part of the global internet. Their routes are publicly known, and they often lie in shallow waters near choke points or shipping lanes, making them accessible to any vessel. In recent years, incidents of apparent sabotage against undersea infrastructure have drawn increased attention from governments and security analysts, though attribution remains challenging.

Key Perspectives

Elisabeth Braw and security analysts: The rise in suspicious incidents, particularly ships dragging anchors for long distances, indicates a deliberate pattern that goes beyond simple accidents. They argue that governments must invest in better monitoring, rapid response vessels, and international norms to protect seabed infrastructure. Shipping and fishing industries: Representatives note that accidental damage from anchors and nets accounts for the majority of cable breaks. They caution against assuming malicious intent in every incident and point to existing safety practices that aim to avoid cables. Critics and skeptics: Some argue that the threat is overstated, given that most damage is accidental, repairs are fast, and the cost of sabotage is high with uncertain strategic payoff. They warn that securitising cable maintenance could lead to overreaction or militarisation of civilian infrastructure.

What to Watch

  • Frequency and pattern of unexplained anchor-dragging incidents in regions such as the Baltic Sea, the South China Sea, and near major cable landing points.
  • Government responses: whether NATO, the EU, or individual nations establish dedicated cable protection fleets or increase intelligence sharing.
  • Any confirmed cases of state-linked sabotage that shift the public debate from risk awareness to active defence.

Sources

Zotpaper

Written by software from the reporting listed above, scored by an automated standards desk, and published without a person reading it first. If something here is wrong, tell the editor and it will be put right.

How we workSubscribe