The Middle East is approaching the end of a century or more in which outside powers drove events and will be shaped primarily by local actors, according to Stephen M. Walt, who argues that the failed US-Israeli war against Iran is accelerating a long-term trend.
Writing in Foreign Policy, Walt asserts that the period in which outside powers drove events in the region is ending. 'For the first time since 1919, what happens there will be primarily determined by the local actors themselves,' he writes.
The modern Middle East was heavily shaped by great powers, Walt notes, from the Paris Peace Conference carving states out of the Ottoman Empire to Britain, France, and later the United States and Soviet Union arming clients, toppling regimes, and intervening directly. The end of the Cold War did not end the meddling, as the first Bush administration organized the coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, took charge of (and mismanaged) the Oslo peace process, and tried to transform the region by toppling Saddam Hussein in 2003.
But Walt argues that the limits of outside military power have become clear. Failed US interventions in Iraq and Libya, Russia's inability to keep Bashar al-Assad in power, and Israel's inability to fully eliminate Hamas or Hezbollah all demonstrate declining efficacy. The US-Israeli war with Iran, he says, has illuminated the new landscape: weeks of punishing air strikes failed to topple Iran's regime, and the US could not protect its own bases from Iranian retaliation.
Advances in drone and missile technology have raised the cost of external intervention, Walt contends. US aircraft carriers cannot safely operate close to Iran, reducing loiter times and payloads. Defensive systems like Patriot missiles are far more expensive than the drones and missiles they shoot down and are in short supply. Ground invasions are increasingly unattractive as large units become vulnerable to drone and missile strikes.
A second trend, the declining importance of Middle East energy, reinforces the first. Walt notes that while the war has raised fuel prices, most of this is due to limited refining capacity rather than crude supply. Since 1973, the US shale boom and efforts to reduce fossil fuel consumption have made Middle East oil less critical, leading countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE to diversify their economies.
'Put these two trends together, and direct military involvement by outside powers is much less attractive,' Walt writes. He expects the region to see balance-of-power politics where ideologies matter little and shifting coalitions form to check the strongest powers. The US, he predicts, will revert to an 'offshore balancer' role, reducing its military footprint and pursuing businesslike relations with all states.
Walt warns that without outside protection, more Middle Eastern states may seek nuclear deterrents, raising the risk of preventive wars. Internal turmoil may also increase if countries must mobilise real military power rather than buying expensive hardware from foreign contractors. 'The emergence of a more autonomous Middle East could also usher in a new era of internal political turmoil,' he writes, concluding that while the era of foreign efforts to remake the region may be ending, 'don't expect the region to become boring.'
Analysis
Why This Matters
- The US military posture in the Middle East may shrink significantly, with fewer bases and carrier deployments, affecting global power dynamics.
- Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel will face pressure to negotiate security arrangements without relying on superpower backing.
- The risk of nuclear proliferation could increase as states seek deterrents, while internal political instability may rise if elites resist military reform.
Background
The article by Stephen M. Walt, a longtime observer of US foreign policy, arrives amid the ongoing US-Israeli war against Iran, which Walt characterises as a failed effort that has demonstrated the limits of outside military power. Walt places the conflict in the context of a century of great-power intervention in the Middle East, from European mandates to Cold War rivalry and post-9/11 invasions.
What to Watch
- Whether the United States begins reducing its military footprint in the Middle East, as Walt predicts.
- Whether regional actors pursue nuclear weapons programs in the absence of external security guarantees.
- Signs of realignment between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf states as they adjust to a more autonomous regional order.
Checked
11 claims in this story checked against 1 source: 11 supported.
Show each claim
- SupportedThe era of outside powers driving Middle East events is nearing its end, Walt argues.Foreign Policy: “we are approaching the end of a century or more in which outside powers drove events in the region”
- SupportedWalt says the failed U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is a watershed.Foreign Policy: “The failed U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is a watershed event”
- SupportedWalt says that, for the first time since 1919, local actors will primarily determine what happens in the region.Foreign Policy: “For the first time since 1919, what happens there will be primarily determined by the local actors themselves.”
- SupportedWalt says the failed war is accelerating a long-term trend.Foreign Policy: “The failed U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is a watershed event, but it is merely accelerating developments that have been apparent for some time.”
- SupportedWalt writes, “Put these two trends together, and direct military involvement by outside powers is much less attractive.”Foreign Policy: “Put these two trends together, and direct military involvement by outside powers is much less attractive.”
- SupportedWalt says U.S. aircraft carriers cannot safely operate close to Iran, reducing attack aircraft’s loiter times and payloads.Foreign Policy: “U.S. aircraft carriers cannot safely operate close to Iran, which reduces loiter times for attack aircraft and the payloads they can carry.”
- SupportedWalt says most of the war-related fuel-price rises are due to limited refining capacity, not crude-oil supply.Foreign Policy: “most of these price rises are due to limited refining capacity (a problem exacerbated by the Iran war and the war in Ukraine) and not the supply of crude oil itself.”
- SupportedThe first Bush administration organized the coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, took charge of the Oslo peace process, and tried to transform the region by toppling Saddam Hussein in 2003.Foreign Policy: “The first Bush administration organized the coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, sponsored the Madrid Conference of 1991, took charge of (and mismanaged) the Oslo peace process”
- SupportedWalt warns that more Middle Eastern states may seek nuclear deterrents, increasing the risk of preventive wars.Foreign Policy: “if outside powers are no longer willing or able to provide protection, then more Middle Eastern states will be tempted to acquire a nuclear deterrent and the risk of preventive wars to thwart such efforts is likely to grow”
- SupportedWalt writes that a more autonomous Middle East could usher in a new era of internal political turmoil.Foreign Policy: “the emergence of a more autonomous Middle East could also usher in a new era of internal political turmoil.”
- SupportedWalt concludes, “don't expect the region to become boring.”Foreign Policy: “The bottom line: We may be approaching the end of foreign efforts to remake the Middle East, but don’t expect the region to become boring.”