Former Qantas captain David Evans has warned that the post-9/11 security measure of locked, bullet-proof cockpit doors could be exploited by terrorists. Writing in an opinion piece published on October 1, 2026, Evans contrasts the pre-9/11 vulnerability that allowed hijackers to storm the cockpit — as seen with United 93 — with the current locked-door regime. He suggests that the same doors that protect against external threats now allow a terrorist who gains cockpit access to barricade themselves inside, potentially without any means for flight attendants or passengers to intervene. The article, which ends mid-sentence in both publications, is an Opinion piece under the World and Middle East sections. Evans, a former Qantas captain, notes that every modern flight bears the legacy of September 11: slower security queues, confiscated water bottles, and most prominently, the reinforced cockpit door. His central concern is that the solution to one security problem may have created another.
Former Qantas captain warns locked cockpit doors create new terror risk
David Evans argues post-9/11 security measure may now allow attackers to barricade themselves inside
Analysis
Why This Matters
- The argument challenges a cornerstone of post-9/11 aviation security, which has been in place for over two decades.
- If the vulnerability is real, it could force regulators to revisit cockpit access protocols for the first time since 2001.
- The piece comes from a former airline captain, lending it operational credibility in a debate often dominated by security officials.
Background
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, aviation authorities worldwide mandated reinforced, locked cockpit doors on commercial aircraft to prevent hijackers from gaining entry. The measure was widely credited with making it far harder for attackers to take over a plane. However, the locked door also means that if a pilot or a hijacker inside the cockpit decides to lock out the rest of the crew, there is no immediate way to force entry from the cabin. This paradox has been discussed in aviation security circles for years, but rarely voiced publicly by senior pilots.
Key Perspectives
The author (David Evans): As a former Qantas captain, Evans argues that the locked door, while effective against external intrusion, now presents a vulnerability if an attacker manages to get inside the cockpit. He implies that the security regime has not fully accounted for this scenario. Regulators and airlines: The source does not include their response, but generally, regulators have maintained that the benefits of locked doors outweigh the risks, and procedures exist for cockpit access codes and emergency entry. The piece does not mention these countermeasures, leaving the debate incomplete. Critics/Skeptics: Without direct counterargument in the source, it can be noted that any redesign of cockpit security would need to balance preventing external hijackers with preventing internal barricading — a trade-off that has so far favored the current system.
What to Watch
- Whether aviation regulators (such as CASA in Australia or the FAA in the US) respond to Evans's opinion piece with a statement or review.
- Any reports of incidents where cockpit lockout procedures were tested or failed.
- Further commentary from other pilots or aviation security experts on the locked-door paradox.
Sources
- I felt safer piloting planes after 9/11. But now terror can lock itself inside the cockpit — Sydney Morning Herald - Latest News
- I felt safer piloting planes after 9/11. But now terror can lock itself inside the cockpit — Brisbane Times - Latest News