The paper introduces five contamination protocols along a source-authority gradient to evaluate how LLMs adopt false premises from conversation history. Three models (GPT-5.4 Mini, Gemini-3.1 Flash-Lite, GLM-4.5-Air) were tested across ten knowledge domains at temperature zero, totaling 22,500 turns, with a dual-track automated judge validated against human gold standard (Cohen's κ=0.901).
GPT-5.4 Mini showed zero adoptions across all 500 sessions, indicating a content-independent policy. Gemini exhibited a steep authority gradient: 0.1% adoption for self-attributed falsehoods, 23.5% for user-cited sources, 68.2% for system-injected authority, and 94.0% under instruction override. GLM showed a shallower gradient (15.8% vs 84.2%), a 68-percentage-point dissociation confirming authority deference and instruction compliance as distinct mechanisms. Recovery also diverged: GLM recovered in 94.5% of affected sessions, while 26.1% of affected Gemini sessions never recovered (40.0% under instruction override). These findings demonstrate that conversation history is an untrusted attack surface requiring provenance-aware system design.