Stronger LLM judges accept more tampered outputs, not fewer

In 7,560 scored examples, tampered-output acceptance rises from 88.6% for rule-based scorers to 94.1% for GPT-5-nano, and trigger-conditional tampering yields up to 100% harmful outputs.

Academic
Jianchang Su · Dawei Xiang · Yifan Zhang · Wei Zhang

University of Connecticut

Research Digest··2 min read
The authors introduce DIB-Bench, a benchmark for measuring whether LLM evaluators detect deployment tampering.

The authors construct DIB-Bench, a protocol that applies six classes of deployment tampering to LLM-agent stacks across three model pairs and three random seeds, yielding 7,560 scored examples.

Why this paper

From University of Connecticut

In one line

Output-only evaluation cannot detect deployment tampering; stronger judges accept more tampered outputs, so identity evidence is required.

What we could check

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  • ✓Limitations stated by the authors (2 noted)
  • ✓Reports numbers on named benchmarks

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Research Digest

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