A broad supply-chain attack leveraging compromised identity and access management (IAM) credentials associated with cloud data platform Qubole has allowed unknown attackers to assume trusted integration roles and steal secrets and sensitive data from multiple customer AWS environments, according to Google's cloud security firm Wiz.
Wiz, working with Google's Mandiant incident responders, traced the malicious activity to October 14, when credentials associated with Qubole's AWS account were used to call the sts:AssumeRole API and obtain temporary credentials for customer-managed integration roles. The activity continued on October 15, and on October 18, attackers began using a second IAM user from the same account.
Qubole is a cloud data processing platform that uses cross-account IAM roles to manage compute and access storage in customers' AWS environments without requiring long-lived access keys. The supply-chain attack abused this third-party, cross-account trust relationship. "Because many organizations left trust policies active even after deprecating the platform, the attacker was able to successfully assume integration roles, enumerate cloud resources, harvest secrets, and siphon data," the Wiz researchers told The Register.
Inside the compromised customer environments, the attackers probed numerous AWS services, stealing credentials, keys, and other secrets stored across Lambda, Secrets Manager, and SSM Parameter Store. The intruders also used TruffleHog to test AWS credentials belonging to victim organizations, uncover Microsoft Entra ID secrets, and request OAuth tokens using Okta client credentials found during the snooping. The malicious actors downloaded entire S3 buckets from some victims; they seemed to be largely opportunistic attackers rather than state-sponsored spies looking for specific data.
Neither AWS nor Qubole responded to The Register's inquiries about the incident. Wiz declined to disclose the exact number of organizations affected but described the operation as a "broad, opportunistic supply chain campaign" impacting "multiple" customers. The threat hunters have not attributed the attack to any particular group and say they have no insight into how the stolen data is being used.
In a separate campaign observed between October 8 and October 11, investigators spotted activity using customer-owned AWS access keys for Qubole integrations. While a "small number" of these also resulted in compromised environments, Wiz said it cannot definitively connect the two sets of malicious activity.
Wiz advised organizations that have integrated with Qubole to rotate credentials, noting that rotating a credential does not end temporary sessions already issued. Customers should review their CloudTrail logs from October 1 onward for AssumeRole events where userIdentity.accountId matches Qubole's AWS account ID (805246085872), especially those originating from non-AWS IP addresses. "If the threat actor assumed an integration role, rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable the role could read, and revoke active sessions for the role," the researchers wrote.
Analysis
Why This Matters
- Exploits a fundamental weakness in cloud trust models: deprecating a third-party service is not enough if cross-account IAM trust policies remain active, exposing legacy integrations to attack.
- Demonstrates a highly automated, credential-focused attack chain that leverages legitimate infrastructure for lateral movement and data exfiltration across multiple customer environments.
- Highlights the challenge of defending against supply chain attacks targeting widely-used integration patterns in AWS, where trusted third parties can be the weakest link.
Background
Qubole is a cloud data processing platform that relied on cross-account IAM roles to give it access to run compute and manage storage within its customers' AWS environments. This trust mechanism is the vector exploited in the attack. Wiz, a cloud security firm acquired by Google, specializes in identifying such cloud-native threats and worked with Google's Mandiant incident response unit on the investigation.
What to Watch
- Whether Qubole or AWS will release a detailed post-mortem explaining how the initial credentials were compromised and what further steps they are taking.
- Potential follow-up investigations from affected organizations as they review CloudTrail logs and assess the full scope of the breach, which may reveal more victims.
- Industry-wide impact on how cross-account IAM roles are configured and deprecated in cloud environments, given the oversight of leaving trust policies active after platform deprecation.
Checked
11 claims in this story checked against 1 source: 10 supported.
Show each claim
- SupportedThe Qubole AWS integration attack stole secrets and sensitive data from multiple customer AWS environments.www.theregister.com - Articles: “Unknown attackers used compromised identity and access management (IAM) credentials associated with Qubole's AWS account to access customer AWS environments, stealing secrets and other sensitive data from S3 buckets. ... called it a “broad, opportunistic supply chain campaign” that hit “multiple” customer environments.”
- SupportedWiz and Mandiant traced the malicious activity to October 14.www.theregister.com - Articles: “Wiz, working with Google's Mandiant incident responders after AI data security company Sentra flagged suspicious activity, traced the malicious activity back to October 14”
- SupportedNeither AWS nor Qubole responded to The Register’s inquiries.www.theregister.com - Articles: “Neither AWS nor Qubole responded to The Register's inquiries.”
- SupportedThe researchers said active trust policies let the attacker assume integration roles, enumerate resources, harvest secrets and siphon data.www.theregister.com - Articles: ““Because many organizations left trust policies active even after deprecating the platform, the attacker was able to successfully assume integration roles, enumerate cloud resources, harvest secrets, and siphon data,” the researchers told The Register in an emailed response to questions.”
- SupportedQubole-associated credentials were used to call sts:AssumeRole on October 14; activity continued October 15, and a second IAM user was used on October 18.www.theregister.com - Articles: “traced the malicious activity back to October 14, when credentials associated with Qubole's AWS account were used to call the sts:AssumeRole API to obtain temporary credentials for customer-managed integration roles. ... This activity continued on October 15, and on October 18, the digital intruders began using a second IAM user from the same account.”
- SupportedThe attackers used TruffleHog to test victim AWS credentials, discover Microsoft Entra ID secrets and request OAuth tokens using Okta client credentials.www.theregister.com - Articles: “The miscreants also used TruffleHog to test AWS credentials belonging to victim organizations, discover their Microsoft Entra ID secrets, and request OAuth tokens using Okta client credentials also uncovered while snooping around the AWS environments.”
- SupportedThe attackers downloaded entire S3 buckets from some victims and appeared largely opportunistic rather than focused on specific data.www.theregister.com - Articles: “Abusing the integration roles also allowed the criminals to steal data from customers’ S3 storage, although it seems they were largely opportunistic attackers, in some cases downloading entire buckets, as opposed to state-sponsored spies looking for specific data.”
- Partly supportedWiz spotted a separate campaign between October 8 and October 11 using customer-owned AWS access keys for Qubole integrations.www.theregister.com - Articles: “While investigating this incident, Wiz spotted a separate campaign between October 8 and October 11 that also used customer-owned AWS access keys for Qubole integrations.”
- SupportedA small number of the separate campaign’s cases resulted in compromised customer environments, and Wiz could not definitively connect the two sets of activity.www.theregister.com - Articles: “While a “small number” of these also resulted in the intruders compromising victim organizations’ AWS environments, Wiz said it can’t definitively connect the two sets of malicious activity.”
- SupportedWiz advised Qubole customers to rotate credentials and review CloudTrail from October 1 onward for relevant AssumeRole events, especially those from non-AWS IP addresses.www.theregister.com - Articles: “Organizations that have integrated with Qubole should rotate credentials - although rotating a credential does not end temporary sessions that were already issued. Customers should also review CloudTrail from October 1 onward, looking for AssumeRole events where userIdentity.accountId matches Qubole's AWS account ID, 805246085872, particularly those originating from non-AWS IP addresses.”
- SupportedThe researchers advised rotating every secret, parameter and readable Lambda environment variable and revoking active sessions if an integration role was assumed.www.theregister.com - Articles: ““If the threat actor assumed an integration role, rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable the role could read, and revoke active sessions for the role.””