The Symantec Threat Hunter Team discovered the attack agent when it fell into an AI honeypot, a decoy system designed to trap malicious activity. The captured instructions show a single agent designed to scan the entire internet for endpoints that accept OpenAI-style requests without authentication, or that accept a stolen key. Once it finds such an endpoint, the agent can exploit several common web frameworks and carry out dozens of illicit actions, including database theft, credential and secret harvesting, remote code execution, and cryptocurrency mining.
The operators built a malicious loop they called "Skynet mode" that would scan for targets, infect them, deploy miners, and reinfect hosts. The agent was designed to run unattended for up to 100,000 steps without requesting permission from a human operator.
"The jailbreak layers were largely off-the-shelf," Symantec threat hunter Priti More told The Register. "Nothing in the individual techniques is new. What stands out is that someone wired them into a single agent that hands the planning to a borrowed model and runs for up to 100,000 steps without a human."
More noted that the attack creates two sets of victims: "The owner of the exposed endpoint pays for the inference. Any server the agent went on to break into would lose data and be put to work mining. We have no evidence yet that it got that far."
The instruction set included five layers of jailbreaking designed to disguise the model's identity, normalize secret-stealing activities as normal development work, cast the model as a devoted companion who must never refuse an operator, instruct it to ignore its own safety warnings, and finally authorize 74 offensive tool definitions including internet-wide asset discovery, botnet command-and-control, database dumping through Prisma, exploit modules targeting VS Code, Django, Jupyter, Laravel, Supabase, Next.js and Flask/Werkzeug deployments, GraphQL and command injection, and server-side request forgery tools.
Symantec has not attributed the attack agent to a particular person or criminal organization. "The French indicators are the challenge text, the system prompt itself and a French residential IP address on Day 1. They are weak, since an IP address can be a proxy or VPN and the language could be borrowed," More said. "The ENI persona and its 'cold coffee, warm LO' phrase circulate publicly in English-language jailbreak communities, so the operators probably borrowed them rather than wrote them, and they tell us little about who the operators are."
Researchers said the tool represents a shift in how attackers use AI. "The operators built AI into the core of an offensive tool and went looking for models to power it," More and co-author Susmit Yenkar wrote. "The model is used as a reasoning engine that plans and drives the attack, while the scanning, exploitation and mining are carried out by the tool's own modules against separate victims."
