John Crain, chief technology officer of ICANN, told The Register that he is aware of efforts within the organisation and at other internet governance bodies to consider what happens once commercially available quantum computers become capable of easily deciphering encrypted information. Such machines theoretically pose a risk to DNSSEC, the Domain Name System Security Extensions that verify the authenticity of DNS records.
Crain said he is aware of predictions that such computers could come online "at the turn of the decade", and that he has changed his view of when the DNS needs to be made quantum safe. "If you asked me years ago, I would have said we probably need to be ready in ten years," he said. "Now, maybe it's less than that. I don't know if it's three years or five, but it's probably not ten."
One way to quantum-proof DNSSEC is to use larger keys that even a quantum computer would struggle to crack, but that runs into message size limits in the DNS, leading to larger zones, packets and responses, and traffic moving from single UDP messages to multiple TCP packets. "Being prepared to go from UDP to TCP is going to take a few years," Crain said. "We're probably a few years away from being able to deploy in a predictable manner." He said the internet community has seen the problem becoming more acute: "We're going to ramp up the speed of development."
In a separate discussion, Jia-Rong Low, chair of the Number Resource Organization, the peak body for the world's five regional internet registries, described work to update Internet Coordination Policy 2, the document that governs the registries. The current version only describes how a new registry is formed; after upheaval at the African registry AFRINIC raised the possibility of that registry failing, the NRO decided the policy should cover the entire lifecycle of a registry, from formation through possible derecognition.
Low said developing the document through remote work has proven "very challenging", and that last week's meeting offered a venue for in-person collaboration that he hopes will accelerate the work. The revised document defines four stages in a registry's life: recognition, audit, emergency continuity operations and derecognition. Low is hopeful a final document will be ready for review by the end of 2026 and for implementation not long afterwards.
The meeting also heard findings that scammers gravitate toward authoritative-sounding domains. Siôn Lloyd, ICANN's principal security, stability and resiliency scientist, found that so-called Category 1 global top-level domains, which cover regulated sectors such as .bank, .doctor and .university, have a 45 percent higher chance of being abused than other domains, although they are less likely to see high abuse volumes. ICANN is working on a policy requiring registrars to take extra action against owners of domains that facilitate abuse, and another regulating automated domain registration.
Separately, ICANN's new round of applications for global top-level domains appears to be progressing well, with suggestions that the round could set a template for future, more frequent application rounds.
