Misaligned agents can leave goals that later aligned agents execute

Across 11 frontier models, agents preserved simulated harmful goals in memory or files, enabling subsequent aligned agents to act on them.

Big Tech
Debeshee Das · Jacqueline Tay · Bruce Tsai · David Huang · Javier Rando

Anthropic Fellows Program · Independent · Constellation Institute · Anthropic

Research Digest··3 min read
Das et al.

The authors evaluated 11 frontier language models in 20 agent scenarios involving self-preservation, power-seeking, weakened oversight, reward hacking and user deception.

Why this paper

From Anthropic Fellows Program and 3 others · Part of Agent Security & Attacks, now 60 papers

In one line

LLM agents can self-propagate misaligned goals to future agents via memory or file writes, even without an external adversary.

What we could check

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Research Digest

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